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BASIC CONCEPTS
OF THE
INTELLIGENCE PROCESS

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BASIC CONCEPTS
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. The Role of Intelligence

Intelligence is the knowledge about other countries which policy makers and operating officials need in order to arrive at wise decisions. There is general agreement that it is the task of the intelligence organization to provide that knowledge. There are, however, differences of opinion about the extent to which intelligence should contribute to the decision-making process. One view is that intelligence organizations should collect data as needed and report these data to the decision-maker, who will determine for himself their worth and will integrate them with other data required to reach his decision. Another view, essentially an extension of the first, is that in addition to collecting and transmitting data to the decision-maker, the intelligence organization should

determine the worth, validity, and significance of the data. This additional responsibility considerably broadens the task of the intelligence organization and relieves the decision-maker from examining masses of data. A third view, a still further extension of the first, is that the intelligence organization should imagine itself in the position of the decision-makers of another country and should attempt to predict what those decision-makers are going to do.

Each of these views is valid, but only in terms of the relative complexities of situations in which decisions are needed. The following examples illustrate these views:

- (1.) The commander of a military unit assigns a soldier the task of manning a forward observation post and instructs the soldier to report his findings. The commander receives the information as it is reported by the soldier, assesses it, and decides what to do, basing his decision on the sum of his knowledge of the situation.

(2.) The commander of a military unit assigns an intelligence officer to receive information from a number of forward observation posts. The intelligence officer assesses the observation and reporting qualities of the soldiers at the posts; evaluates the incoming information in terms of its worth, consistency, and relation to other data at hand and informs the commander of its significance.

(3.) The commander of a military unit knows that the enemy commander has a number of courses of action open to him. The enemy might retreat, advance, perform a flanking movement, or remain in his present position. The intelligence officer, putting himself in the enemy's position and using all available knowledge about the enemy and his situation, tries to determine which course of action the enemy commander is most likely to adopt. This, the most probable course of action of the enemy, is what the intelligence officer reports to the commander.

These views of the role of intelligence can be applied similarly to intelligence support in the formulation of foreign policy. In this context, intelligence once meant, almost exclusively, the gathering, by secret means, of information to be used by statesmen. The determination of the significance of the information was left to those who were going to use it. Side by side with this secret collection went the reporting, by duly accredited representatives to foreign countries, of information more or less generally available about the politics, economics, armed forces, and other information of the country in which they were stationed. Until recently, however, this type of reporting was not generally considered to be a part of the intelligence function.

With the developing realization of the close inter-relationship between foreign affairs in the traditional sense, and military, and economic, and propaganda activities affecting foreign relations and national security, intelligence organizations were increasingly called upon to provide policy makers and operational personnel in all of these areas of activity not only with evaluated data, but also with interpretations of its significance, estimates of the possible and probable courses of action of foreign countries, and finally with estimates of probable foreign reactions to the adoption of policies and actions under consideration.

B. The Intelligence Process

On the combat level of an army, intelligence serves the commander's needs for data on the enemy, terrain, and weather. The intelligence officer translates these needs into requirements for the collection of information. Collection of the information is accomplished by those elements of the command capable of gathering such information. The intelligence officer evaluates the information collected, particularly that on the enemy, interprets the information in terms of enemy capabilities (actions open to the enemy) and enemy vulnerabilities (enemy weaknesses which are exploitable) and advises the commander of the most probable course of action open to the enemy. The commander's decision to embark on a course of action of his own is based on the intelligence provided him plus his knowledge of the capabilities and vulnerabilities of his own military force. The consequences of his action create needs for new information, and the process is repeated.

In terms of national security, the need for intelligence generally originates with a policy maker or executor of policy, who requires intelligence on foreign areas to enable him to do his job. If the data is not immediately available in a useful form, intelligence-producing organizations may be asked to provide it.

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Intelligence producers, in turn, need information in order to produce intelligence. Part of this information is obtained from files, libraries, and other repositories of information. Some information, however, must be obtained by ordering its collection. Such orders are called "collection requirements." The intelligence producers, using the collected information and data in intelligence files, perform a research function, the final product of which is designed to serve the needs of the policy makers and executives.

Government policymaking and operational decisions are participated in by many persons in a wide variety of roles--all of whom have a need for collected information. Such information may be disseminated simultaneously to those elements of the government conducting operations and making policy decision, as well as to intelligence reference facilities and to intelligence research analysts.

A central intelligence reference service, which makes available information collected and produced in the past is, however, a recent and very important part of a modern intelligence system. To this service all the intelligence components of government submit the information they collect and it in turn makes available to all the components the sum total of that information properly indexed.

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C. Information and Intelligence

Information refers to the whole range of data collected. When a collector, however, selects some information in answer to requirements of potential users, it becomes "intelligence information," which differs from raw information in that it is selected for its bearing on an operational or policy problem.

Intelligence information, although sometimes useful, is not generally considered to be intelligence until it is further processed, that is, evaluated, analyzed, integrated, and interpreted. This processing is something like an industrial process: iron ore, coal, and limestone are smelted to make iron or steel. The resultant product, iron or steel, is something quite different from the various materials assembled in the furnace.

It is not until the information is compiled and fully processed in terms of an operational or policy problem, that it may be said to have become intelligence. The Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage summarizes the processes in its definition of intelligence:

"The product resulting from the collection evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation of all available information which concerns one or more aspects of foreign nations or of areas of operations and which is immediately or potentially significant to planning."

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"Evaluation, analysis, integration interpretation" are factors in intelligence processing, or production of intelligence, and will be discussed later.

D. Subdivisions of Intelligence

The present broad range of intelligence activities has resulted in the subdivision of intelligence into three kinds of specialized categories: (1) subject; (2) purpose and time range and (3) use.

Intelligence Categories

(1) SUBJECT

- Political
- Social
- Cultural
- Scientific
- Technical
- Military
- Economic
- Counterintelligence
- Other

(2) PURPOSE AND TIME RANGE

- Basic
- Current
- Estimative

(3) USE

- Departmental
- Interdepartmental and Joint
- National

1. Subject Matter: The entire field of intelligence can be classified in terms of the subject matter with which it is concerned. Intelligence specialists concentrate their efforts in such fields as science, mathematics, economics, politics, sociology, and geography. Indeed,

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as the division of labor in intelligence production progresses, additional intelligence specialties developed such as, biographic or photographic intelligence. This extensive array of mental disciplines is today necessary to serve governmental foreign policy and military planners. The military capability of a modern nation is dependent on the economy which supports its armed forces, the scientific and technological advances which can be turned into weapons of war, the attitudes of its people toward war and the political conditions which permit, encourage, or prohibit war. The military planner must take into consideration all these factors in considering whether a nation must prepare to defend itself against a potentially hostile nation.

2 Purpose and Time Range: Another way the entire field of intelligence can be divided is by the purpose and time range of the intelligence. Specialized elements of intelligence agencies concern themselves with (1) Basic Intelligence; (2) Current Intelligence and (3) Estimative Intelligence. The time element is an essential part of these categories--past, present, and future--and it is related to the purpose--background, action, and planning.

Basic Intelligence is an encyclopedic compilation of information of a more or less permanent or static nature and of general interest. Its purpose is to

provide basic data and background information for military planners and other government executives and for intelligence research workers.

Current Intelligence is that spot intelligence of all types and forms of immediate interest and value to operating or policy staffs which is used by them usually without the delays incident to complete evaluation or interpretation. The most usual form of current intelligence is a digest piece of information received from any source and accompanied by an intelligence specialist's statement concerning the significance of that information. The intelligence specialist, usually an area or functional specialist, weighs this piece of information against other information at his disposal and interprets the significance of this information in terms of his knowledge of the intelligence needs of various users or operating or policy staffs. Normally, current intelligence is produced on the most recently procured and important information, so that the timeliness or newness of the information is a prime consideration. It is quite possible, however, that a report of an event which occurred some time ago but which has a distinct bearing on current events will be processed as current intelligence. As an extreme example, if a highly reliable source of information reported that

Joseph Stalin was done away with by the other members of the Presidium of the CPSU in 1953, this would most likely be an item worthy of current intelligence evaluation and interpretation.

Estimative Intelligence is that intelligence which, using other intelligence as a base, attempts to predict trends and probable courses of action of a foreign nation or of opposing military forces. Although limited predictions are made in both current and basic intelligence, the strategic estimate of conditions in foreign areas and the probable courses of actions of other nations is a recent development not because it is an estimate but because it is based on all the information available in intelligence organizations of the government. An estimate may range from a prediction of conditions during the next six months in a small South American country to an estimate of Soviet capabilities for global war during the next ten years.

3. Use: Three distinctions are made in the use of intelligence.

Departmental Intelligence is that intelligence needed and normally produced by a Department or independent agency of the Federal Government to aid in the execution of its mission and lawful responsibilities. Departmental intelligence generally refers to intelligence produced by

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the intelligence components of the Departments of the Army, Navy, Air Force, State and some elements CIA to meet the needs of the planners and operating officials in their own agencies.

Interdepartmental Intelligence is integrated departmental intelligence which is required by departments and agencies for the execution of their missions but transcends the competence of a single department to produce.

Joint Intelligence is a term peculiar to the Department of Defense. It is a special category of interdepartmental intelligence jointly produced by the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force. It is used for the joint planning done at the level of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Department of Defense.

National Intelligence is integrated departmental intelligence that covers the broad aspects of national policy and national security, that is of concern to more than one Department or Agency, and that transcends the exclusive competence of a single Department or Agency. National intelligence is normally produced by combining finished intelligence contributions from those intelligence agencies most competent to produce intelligence in a particular field. For example, the Army's intelligence organization is best equipped to provide intelligence on

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the Soviet Army; the Navy's intelligence organization, on the Soviet Navy; and State's intelligence organization, on the political situation in the USSR. The contributions of these agencies and others may well be integrated into an intelligence estimate of Soviet capability to conduct war. The overall estimate is national intelligence.

II. COLLECTION OF INFORMATION

A. Introduction

The word "collection" is often used to refer to any one of three different intelligence processes (1) initial gathering (2) cumulative filing, and (3) assembly of information, or to combinations of these processes. To obtain a sharp and clear understanding of the intelligence processes to which these terms refer. Each term is here defined.

Assembly, a part of the research process, is primarily the exploitation of reference facilities to accumulate data relating to a specific problem under consideration.

Cumulative filing refers to the indexing and filing for reference purposes of information already reported as is done in the library, in analysts files, and in other specialized repositories.

Initial gathering is the selection of pertinent data on the basis of collection requirements and guidance lists

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out of the whole gamut of existing facts obtainable by direct observation, and from persons, documents, publications, broadcasts, and other sources. This is the job done by the collection elements of the intelligence community and is what is most often meant by the term "collection." Once the material has been gathered, the collector has the responsibility of reporting or forwarding it to producers of intelligence or to other users.

B. Collection Guidance

Since collection is meant to satisfy users' needs for data, collectors must have some form of guidance as to what is needed. This guidance is provided by collection guides and collection requirements, and by formal training.

1. Collection Guides: Collectors of information are usually equipped with a broad statement of their collection responsibilities, often referred to as collection guides. These guides indicate general subjects about which there is a continuing need for information. For example, political analysts and others are continually assessing the strength and activities of national Communist parties. Those collectors capable of providing this type of information have a continuing collection responsibility which is spelled out in a collection guide. The collection guide will indicate the specific aspects of national Communism upon which the collector should concentrate his efforts.

2. Collection Requirements: Collection

requirements are requests for collection of quite specific information. These requirements usually include background data already known on the subject and recommendations relative to possible sources of information and methods of collection. For example, a military attache in a foreign country may be asked to observe as closely as possible, while attending a military maneuver, the supply system employed by a foreign army. Included in this requirement may be a summary statement of what is currently known about the supply system. He may be requested to attempt to have himself assigned to this phase of the maneuvers as an observer. For the most part, the instructions for collection are merely suggestions to the field collector, since he best knows the opportunities for collection and his own collection capabilities.

C. Spontaneous Collection

Most information collection is stimulated by requirements as discussed above, but the field collector is often in a position to procure information for which he has no requirements. If, on the basis of his own judgment and experience, he feels that the information has intelligence value, he should collect the information. For example, if a diplomat in the normal course of his duties were to overhear

a remark of military significance, normally outside his collection responsibilities, he would report this information to the military attache who, in turn, would report the information to the proper component of the military intelligence organization.

D. Priorities for Collection

Whenever the demand for something is greater than the supply, a priority system is needed to assure that the most pressing needs are satisfied first. Intelligence collectors usually are in the position of having many more requests for information than they can possibly fulfill in complete detail. (This is particularly true of clandestine collectors.) As a consequence systems have been devised to help collectors determine which subjects or sources to give attention first and how much effort to allot to each. Attache's normally are provided with reporting schedules for required reports. These schedules often include detailed outlines of the subject matter to be reported as well as the time the reports are due. Collectors exploiting a particular source such as radio broadcasts or publications usually give first attention to the sources proven most fruitful by experience. These would be the broadcasts which normally contain most items of intelligence interest. Any available extra time might be used on other less fruitful broadcasts. In special or urgent situations, a special

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directive would turn the attention of collectors to some usually insignificant broadcast for information on a special event. Priorities for clandestine collection are determined by a special coordinating committee and staffs set up for this purpose.

E. Sources of Information

A source of information is that person, place, or document from which information of value can be obtained. In the strictest sense, the collector of information collects from the source, or collects the source itself. A source of information can be a map that a military attache receives from the army of another nation. A source can be a person who provides information verbally. It can be a document or an event witnessed by the field collector. The types of sources of information are many, varied, and widely dispersed. Sources of information commonly exploited by collectors are newspapers, magazines, technical journals, books, radio transmissions, foreign officials, travelers, aliens, refugees, defectors, photographs and films. The collector is rarely the initial source of information. In general, the source of information is the document, object, or a person, exploited by collection methods.

F. Collectors and Methods

Most governments have some form of systematic collection of information to serve intelligence needs. The system normally includes a covert and an overt collection effort and a domestic and a foreign effort. Usually, the clandestine effort is conducted in foreign areas, that of overt collection effort both at home and abroad.

1. Clandestine Collection: The high costs in terms of personnel, time, and money and the risks involved in clandestine collection, militate against its extensive use except when the access to desired information is denied. During periods of international tension or in time of war, when positive security steps are taken by nations to prevent information of value coming into the hands of a hostile state, covert collection becomes important. An intelligence axiom might well be stated as follows: clandestine collection of information is undertaken only if the information is inaccessible to overt means of collection. Clandestine collectors thus concentrate on the collection of information considered sensitive by the target country, and in areas of denied or limited access. One instance where clandestine collection can occur domestically is in the field of counter-intelligence in which the internal security forces of a nation attempt to thwart the penetration efforts of the intelligence services of other nations.

Normally, clandestine collectors of information work ~~work~~ through paid or otherwise motivated agents. The agents are chosen on the basis of many factors. A most important one of these is accessibility to the desired information. For example, a dissatisfied member of a foreign Communist party may be hired to provide information on party membership and activities which the party normally would not reveal. Although clandestine collection of information can be very profitable, it can create difficulties in terms of acceptance of the validity of the information by the users, as well as pose problems of strained political relationships between nations when it is exposed.

2. Diplomatic Collectors: One of the responsibilities of foreign service officers aside from their diplomatic duties is the overt collection of information. Their duties in collection are largely in the field of political information. Their usual means of collection are through the exchange of information, conversation, or observation.

3. Military Collectors: Most peacetime military collection is accomplished through attaches of the armed forces assigned to foreign missions. Aside from their duties as aides to ambassadors, they collect information on the armed forces of the nation by contact with military officials, observation of maneuvers, visits to installations,

and exchange of military information such as training manuals. During time of war, each military commander in the chain of command has an intelligence organization, one part of which consists of units which are responsible for collecting information necessary to accomplish the commander's objective.

4. Other Collectors in Foreign Areas: Most government officials stationed overseas, in addition to those mentioned above, have collection responsibilities incidental to their other activities. For example, agricultural and commercial attaches collect information in their fields.

5. Collection of Overt Publications: The collection of overt publications can be carried out either by subscription to, or by purchase of, publications, in foreign countries. The types of publications collected are the more important newspapers, news magazines, professional journals, books, government publications, and any other publications which may contain information of intelligence value. Maps compiled and printed in foreign areas are also collected because of the wealth of detail they contain.

6. Collection by Radio Monitoring: Much current information can be procured by monitoring foreign voice broadcasts. This monitoring yields current information from clear text messages, and communications information from encoded messages. The latter information is useful in breaking the codes of other governments.

7. Collection by Photography: Photography, both ground and aerial, is a technique employed to some degree, by most collectors of information. Extensive use is made of aerial photography to discover enemy locations, strength, activity, and installations. It also provides strategic information for bombing missions and assessment of the effectiveness of bombing. Ground photography of buildings, factories, ports, and persons taken covertly or overtly, provides important information for economic analysis as well as for target analysis.

8. Domestic Collection: Within any country there are always people who have studied about or traveled to areas of intelligence interest, and in some countries there are large numbers of refugees and immigrants from areas of intelligence interest. These people can be interviewed to obtain information of intelligence value. In addition to people, there are usually business, educational, religious, sports, cultural, and social organizations with foreign contacts and foreign information which may be of intelligence value if proper and timely contacts are made with them. Collection from such sources is termed domestic collection of foreign intelligence information.

C. Reporting of Information

In many instances, field reporting of information means only the forwarding of maps, photographs, physical objects or publications to those people who will exploit the intelligence value of the information. In such instances, the users are able to work directly with the source of information. Other information, however, must be reported in a different form than that in which it appeared when it was collected. For example, an attache who has observed a military maneuver of a foreign army must translate his observations into a logical, objective account which will be useful for intelligence purposes. On the other hand, the collector may receive from an agent a hand-written report which needs only slight editing to make it useful. Whatever the case, the collector should do as clear, complete, unbiased, and objective a reporting job as he possibly can. The collector should also give the users data which will establish the reliability of the source of the information.

This he does by providing, if possible, details about the source and how the information was collected. In some instances an attempt is made by the field collector to give a tentative evaluation of the relative truth of the content of the report. Some collection agencies use a rating system to indicate the degree of reliability of the source

and the credibility of the information. This system consists of six letters, usually running from A through F, each of which indicates a different degree of reliability of the source, and six numbers, usually running from 1 to 6, each of which gives a tentative evaluation of the probable truth of the content. This system is ordinarily used by organizations responsible for covert collection and when such organizations are reporting information from agent personnel or other sensitive sources. Organizations responsible for overt collection generally provide a narrative description of the source to aid the user. In general, the collector should give as much source information as time, space, and security permit. In any case, the user of the information will re-evaluate the information from his own vantage point. In most instances an intelligence researcher will have at his disposal more information on the topic than will the field collector.

III. PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE (Intelligence Research)

A. Introduction

Intelligence production is a broad activity which includes tasks ranging from the evaluation and interpretation of a single information report to the compilation and interpretation of all available relevant data on a subject

such as the probability of attack by another major power. There is no mystery to intelligence production. In most of its characteristics it is no different from the research conducted by scholars. The techniques of research in intelligence are those borrowed from the academic disciplines or the press. Intelligence research differs from other research in that it is conducted under security conditions, may utilize classified material and serves the needs of governmental planners and operating officials engaged in protecting the national security and in conducting foreign affairs. As mentioned previously, the production of intelligence, particularly in its simpler context of evaluation and interpretation of information, may be performed by the policy planner or by the operating official. More often, however, production is a task for intelligence specialists trained and experienced in the complexities of intelligence research.

B. Guidance of Intelligence Research

Intelligence research is conducted primarily as a service to policy planners and operating officials. These users of intelligence must provide guidance to the intelligence researcher by indicating in clear terms precisely what intelligence they need in order to accomplish their missions successfully. Simply stated, a national

security policy planner must know two things in order to plan properly. He must know the capabilities, and vulnerabilities of his own country and, he must know the capabilities, and vulnerabilities; of the area concerning which policy is being made. The latter is usually provided him by the intelligence researcher. Since only the planner knows the scope of the problem for which he needs intelligence, he is the only one who can adequately define his need for intelligence. The researcher working on an intelligence problem cannot produce usable intelligence without proper guidance from the planner. Clearly the intelligence researcher needs guidance, the more specific the better.

Guidance consists of several major factors. First, a statement of the intelligence problem, its limits and depth, is required and, if possible, a statement indicating how the intelligence is going to be used. Second, the analyst should know whether he should interpret his research and what sort of interpretation is desired. Third, the analyst should know when the research should be finished so that it will be of maximum use to the planner. In addition to this direct guidance there exists an indirect form of guidance based on general and continuing needs of policy planners and operating officials. These intelligence needs are satisfied through the setting up and operating of

intelligence programs as distinct from individual research efforts. For example, continuing study of the status and capabilities of the armed forces of a particular country and periodic publication of the results of that study would be such an intelligence program. There would be initial guidance in great detail, but when this was completed, very little guidance would be needed by the intelligence researchers for the operation and maintenance of the program.

C. The Research Process

After the intelligence analyst knows what his research problem is, he proceeds to use the tools of research to accomplish his task. There are many ways of describing the research process and the steps involved. The process described here consists of the following: assembly of data; evaluation, analysis, integration of the data; interpretation of the product; and presentation of the intelligence product to the user. Assembly of data and presentation are primarily physical processes, while evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation are essentially mental processes. For purposes of description, each of the above steps will be treated separately, but it should be understood that several of the steps can occur simultaneously; that certain of the steps may be omitted, and that later steps can precede the earlier steps.

1. Assembly: The process of assembly involves the gathering of all data relevant to the intelligence problem. The researcher needs to know what data he must have and where to find them. He uses both those data which have been previously collected and those which are constantly coming in from collectors, perhaps during the entire period of the research effort.

Typical sources of data are:

a. The Researcher: Most intelligence research specialists are employed because of their specialized training in one or more of the academic disciplines such as political science, economics, science, and language. They bring to the job specialized knowledge that enables them to discriminate in later mental processes.

b. The Researcher's Files: Normally, a researcher in any type of intelligence will build up files of material pertinent to his general field of responsibility. From those files, he can draw material as specific intelligence problems are assigned to him. For example, a political analyst dealing with France would keep in his files information on all aspects of French politics. From such files he could draw information dealing with a specific political party.

c. Overt Non-intelligence Facilities: Many libraries and other specialized repositories can provide a great deal of information to the researcher. In fact, it is conceivable

that all the data necessary to the solution of the intelligence problem can be obtained from such facilities. A familiarity with such repositories is part of the basic knowledge of the researcher.

d. Intelligence Repositories: General and specialized intelligence repositories are exploited for data by the researcher. Specialized intelligence repositories include those set up for biographic data, industrial data, photography, and maps.

e. Incoming Information: One of the most time-consuming responsibilities of an intelligence researcher is the reading of incoming information reports. He reads these for three reasons: to keep his knowledge of his subject current; to divert to his files information of future use, and to extract information pertinent to the intelligence research he is currently conducting. Incoming reports bearing on his intelligence research may influence his work up to the time of presentation of the intelligence to the user.

As the intelligence researcher proceeds with the gathering of information, he is forced, for the sake of efficiency, to develop a logical system of recording the information. He uses a system of note-taking, and develops files in accordance with his preconceptions of the normal subdivisions of the over-all intelligence problem. The

mental aspects of assembly are the determination of what kinds of information are needed and where the information can be acquired and the selection of specific pieces of information which are relevant to the research problem.

2. Evaluation: Each item of information assembled by the intelligence researcher must be evaluated in terms of (a) probable pertinence to the research problem and (b) consistency of fact with known fact. The researcher is not bound by any evaluation placed on a report by the field collector. He should not, however, ignore the field evaluation since the evaluation was put there to guide him in his determination of the worth of the information.

The researcher encounters relatively little difficulty in evaluating information when the source is documentary material in its original form, but when the original information is clouded by translation and unclear reporting, the analyst makes mental reservations about the probable truth of the information. Furthermore, if he is judging a report from an individual who has been the source of poor information in the past, the analyst will be alerted to scrutinize the information thoroughly.

a. Pertinence To The Research Problem: The researcher should examine the information in great detail

and make some determination of the probable value of information to the research problem. He has done this to some extent in the selection of material, but now he must make this determination in greater depth. It is at this stage that the analyst is forced to make tentative decisions about how he will proceed with the research. Inevitably, as he proceeds with the evaluation tentative hypotheses relating to the intelligence problem will occur to him.

b. Consistency With Other Known Facts: The analyst must determine how the facts in the information coincide with other known information. He may discover that a new piece of information contradicts a broad base of previous knowledge on the subject or that the information contradicts one other known set of facts. In the latter case, the analyst should carefully weigh the two opposing sets of data before deciding which is the most probable. Information which confirms previous information tends to increase the value of the already known information. Even here, however, the analyst must be alert for false confirmation and deception. It is quite possible that information reported by two or more collectors might emanate from a single source, and one report falsely confirm another. Deception is the technique of feeding erroneous information into several collection channels to mislead intelligence personnel and, ultimately, the user. For example, a nation

about to embark on a war with another nation, may try to funnel into the latter's intelligence system information contrary to the former's real intentions.

In addition to relating the information to other known information, the researcher should examine a report for internal consistency. The report should not be self-contradictory if it is to be of value. On initial scanning, a report may seem quite logical, but a detailed examination can reveal glaring inconsistencies.

3. Analysis: Analysis is defined as "separation of anything into its constituent parts or elements; also, an examination of anything to distinguish its component parts or elements, separately or in relation to the whole." Analysis is a division rather than a building process. At this stage in the research process, the analyst attempts to prove or disprove the validity of facts by critically comparing them with related facts.

Let us assume that an analyst is working on an intelligence problem dealing with the strategic implications of the disposition of the Soviet Army. He has a report which states that the Russian 76th Airborne Division is located at Krakow, Poland. If true, this information would be highly useful but, unfortunately, the analyst is unsure of the source of the information. By an analytical process he determines what

else he should know in order to prove or disprove the statement. He might find a translation of a Polish newspaper article which states that the Mayor of Krakow entertained the commanding general of the 76th Division. A list of Soviet Bloc unit designations might show that Russian airborne divisions are numbered serially from 120 through 140, but that Polish airborne divisions are numbered serially from 75 through 80. The newspaper translation would tend to substantiate the original statement, while the list of Bloc units would tend to refute it but throw a different light on the information, namely that this is probably a Polish division and not Russian. Thus, analysis is the examination of those sub-factors which tend to prove or disprove a larger factor.

4. Integration: Analysis divides, and integration builds. The latter process is often described in intelligence as the building of a mosaic or putting the pieces of information together in proper relation to one another to give a unified whole. The whole is essentially different from any of the individual pieces which went into the whole. A piece of information, formerly an entity, may in the new product be a statistic in a table, a contour line on a map, or part of an idea expressed in words.

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The process, integration, is sometimes described by using the terms correlation and synthesis. Correlation is the act of establishing mutual relations--the mosaic idea. Synthesis is the building of the parts into a unified whole to create a new entity. The two terms are not mutually exclusive.

Typical products of integration are intelligence maps, statistical tables, and a report describing the chemical industry of the U.S.S.R. Each of these is a result of a reasoning and compilation process based on observable phenomena. From these observable phenomena, certain conclusions are derived.

5. Interpretation: Interpretation is the determination of the significance of the product resulting from integration. At this stage, the analyst must go beyond the information he has integrated and ask the question, "What does all this mean?" It is at this point that the analyst becomes less the cautious scholar and more the intelligence officer. The analyst is called upon to bring into play his ingenuity, experience, and judgment. For example, having completed a study of the development in another country of a new toxic chemical, the scientific analyst should indicate whether this chemical could be used as a nerve gas; whether it could be spread broadcast, and, if so, by what means; or whether

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large scale production and storage is feasible. These are the things which the policy maker and operating official often need because they do not have the specialized knowledge necessary to derive such interpretations from the basic intelligence study. Furthermore, the analyst should say those things which reflect accurately the results of his research whether or not such results are palatable to the users.

There has been an attempt in the foregoing to isolate the several factors in the mental process of intelligence research. In practice, these factors operate simultaneously, so while the analyst is evaluating a particular document he most likely is relating it to the other information with which he is working. He often automatically analyzes the information in the document, finding proofs and contradictions from his memory. Also, interpretation can occur at this stage. As the analyst scans a document he can make assumptions that if a certain thing is true, then a certain significance emerges.

6. Presentation: At the beginning of the research problem, the analyst concerns himself with the form in which the intelligence will be presented to the user. He shapes his research effort to a great extent by the manner in which he will present it. If his final product is to be an annotated intelligence map, the techniques he employs would be different from those he would use to prepare a detailed written study. Generally speaking, intelligence is

presented in written, graphic, or oral form. Most intelligence is provided in the form of the written word but often oral intelligence briefings keep top officials and military commanders abreast of intelligence developments.

IV. DISSEMINATION

A. Introduction

Dissemination is the process of getting information and intelligence into the hands of the persons who need it. Dissemination is actually composed of two separate functions. The first of these functions is that of deciding who needs the data. Since intelligence organizations strive to prevent their methods and results from becoming known to hostile or potential hostile states, much information collected, and virtually all intelligence produced, are subject to varying degrees of security classification. The "need to know" principle operates to limit the number of recipients of classified data. Strictly speaking, this principle means that regardless of the level of security clearance which an individual has been given, he is entitled to receive only that classified information necessary to the efficient discharge of his responsibilities. Another brake on overlapping dissemination is the rule prohibiting an agency from disseminating another agency's material without permission of the originator. The second

function involved in dissemination is the mechanical one of distributing the data to the indicated recipients.

Ordinarily, an intelligence organization will place the responsibility for this function with one of its service or support components. Techniques such as electrical means and special couriers can speed the distribution when time is an important factor.

B. Information Dissemination

Information is often disseminated by the field collector to other organizations which have field establishments and personnel. For example, a military attache working in an embassy abroad may disseminate collected information to other attaches of his country, to the ambassador, and even the attaches of friendly countries. He must be assured when disseminating information in the field that the other collectors, if they submit that information to their headquarters organization, give the collection credit to him. Failure to do this might ultimately lead to false confirmation of information.

The headquarters of the collecting organization disseminates its information to potential users with a "need to know." Among those are intelligence research (producing) organizations, policy makers, operating officials, and, in some instances, foreign intelligence organizations.

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C. Intelligence Dissemination

Finished intelligence is disseminated in a manner similar to that used in information dissemination. The recipients of intelligence can be the same as the recipients of information, but intelligence is usually disseminated to a narrower more specific group of users. In oral presentation of intelligence, the researcher "disseminates" the intelligence directly to the user.

V. USES OF INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

Intelligence provides knowledge about foreign countries and peoples to government policy makers and executives to help them in making their decisions. For example, intelligence serves in the design of policies to maintain national security. Intelligence also provides estimates of the possible present or future threats to a government and its allies and points up the character and location of possible threats. Such estimates assist people in the executive agencies of the government in making determinations of the over-all magnitude of the defense effort necessary for security. Intelligence may also indicate the intentions or probable courses of action of allies and potential enemies, as well as their weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Such indications allow policy makers and executives of the government to adjust defense preparations to meet the most probable dangers.

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The most immediate use of intelligence is in providing information which assists in making operating decisions. Operating decisions are made at all levels of government and by all executive agencies of the government. For example, one type of report is used by 18 different Departments, Boards, or Bureaus, and 77 of their major Divisions and Offices, and many more Branches and Sections. Although most intelligence and intelligence information reports would not be used so widely, a single report might be used in any of those same Departments, Boards, Bureaus, Divisions, Offices, Branches, or Sections.

Finally, intelligence appraises the probable reactions of foreign governments to alternative courses of action being considered by policy makers.